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## Significant Dates ▶

[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]

### APR

- 14 Day of Aid to Spanish Youth. Celebrated by World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of Students (WFDY and IUS: Communist fronts).
- 16\* USSR and Germany sign Treaty of Rapallo; secret military accord enables Germany to evade Treaty of Versailles by training men and testing and building weapons in USSR. 1922. FORTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY.
- 17\* Lenin delivers "April Theses" in first public appearance after return to Russia. 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 18-27\* First Bandung Conference: 29 Afro-Asian countries participate. 1955.
- 24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and For Peaceful Coexistence. Celebrated by WFDY and IUS. (Communist fronts).
- 26\* 19 Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva on Indochina; 21 July, agree on armistice effective 11 August. Vietnam partitioned, Laos and Cambodia recognized as neutral. 1954.
- 28 "Expo 67" opens in Montreal with Bloc participation.

### MAY

- 1 May Day -- International Workers' Day. First designated by Second International (Socialist Congress) in 1889.
- 7\* V-E Day, end of World War II. 1945.
- 15\* Third International declared dissolved by Soviets; 1943. Announcement on 22 May 1943 declares other Communist Parties to be autonomous.
- 16\* Treaty of Aigun, first of "Unequal Treaties," cedes Chinese territory east of Amur River to Russia. Treaty never ratified, but confirmed by Treaty of Peking, 14 November 1860. 1858.
- 20\* Date for Commemoration of Birth of Buddha. 563 B.C.
- 25\* Josip Broz Tito born. 1892. SEVENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY.
- 31\* Hungarian Premier Ferenc Nagy, in Switzerland for health and threatened by Communists with arrest if he returns, resigns; son held hostage until resignation received. 1947. TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.

### JUN

- 1 International Childrens' Day, celebrated by Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF; Communist front).
- 5\* Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposes European Recovery Plan ("Marshall Plan") in speech at Harvard. 1947. TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 6\* Nicola Petkov, leader of agrarian opposition in Bulgaria, arrested. 1947. TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 11-12\* Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army generals arrested; later tried secretly and executed. 1937. THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY.

## Media Lines

27 February 1967

"Deutsche Welle" Plans More and Stronger Signals. The German Federal Republic's plan to make "Deutsche Welle" one of the Free World's leading international broadcasting services is beginning to materialize. Additional transmitter facilities are already under consideration for the new relay base opened at Kigali, Rwanda, in October, 1966; and funds have been approved for the construction of bases at sites to be selected in Portugal and Central America, the latter possibly on Bonaire, Netherlands Antilles. A search is also underway for a base site in South Asia, and new domestic facilities are projected to service the enlarged overseas relay capabilities as well as for direct broadcast. This decentralized relay network, when completed, will provide "Deutsche Welle" strong competitive signals in the developing areas of Africa, Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and in the Communist World as well.

East German Film and Television -- Coexistence, "Ja"; Collaboration, "Nein". Members of the East German Film and Television Workers' Association were told at their founding congress in late January 1967 that collaboration with their West German counterparts might lead them into "illusions of a third road independent of capitalism and socialism".

"We must rid ourselves of illusions", said Kurt Hager, Head of the Ideological Commission of the SED Politburo. "Today, films and television of the German Democratic Republic serve the cause of Socialism and combat West German imperialism and militarism; and West German films and television are the instruments of a reactionary regime ... Democratic forces in the Federal republic must effect changes that will achieve a peaceful coexistence of the two German states".

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
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27 February 1967

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EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS "DIE-HARD"  
OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN MAINSTREAM

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SITUATION: A three-day meeting in Warsaw of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, originally scheduled to be held in East Berlin, closed on 10 February 1967. The Soviet news agency TASS reported that evening that the representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia had met "in an atmosphere of comradely cooperation and full mutual understanding." That this was not actually the truth can be surmised from the TASS communique's striking omission of the subject of Germany. TASS merely announced without further detail: "At the meeting, a friendly exchange of views was held on questions connected with the efforts of socialist countries aimed at easing international tensions; consolidating peace, security, and cooperation in Europe; and connected with the development of the situation in the European continent since the adoption in Bucharest in July 1966 of the declaration on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe."

Rumania, following its recognition of the West German Government on 31 January and its refusal to attend the Pact meeting if it were held in East Berlin, sent only a Deputy Foreign Minister to Warsaw (its Foreign Minister, Corneliu Manescu, pointedly was in Belgium 6-10 February discussing the "consolidation of peace and security" in Europe). There have been indications that other East European countries -- notably Hungary and Bulgaria -- will continue to explore possibilities for reaching individual agreements with West Germany.

The East German propaganda campaign against West Germany has received something less than enthusiastic support from the USSR; Poland has gone along to some extent, and Czechoslovakia has also been somewhat critical of West German militarism. Soviet notes to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in late January warning of the alleged revival of Nazism in West Germany appear, however, to be a weak sop to the Ulbricht regime. For its part, the East German Foreign Ministry had issued a statement two weeks

prior to the opening of the Warsaw Pact meeting pointedly reminding the other East European countries that they had concurred in last July's Bucharest communique demanding West German recognition of East Germany -- thus implying that such recognition by Bonn should be a precondition of East European recognition of Bonn. (Rumania's recognition followed this East German warning six days later.) On 26 January, the day after the East German Foreign Ministry statement, the leading Party daily, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (see attachment), specifically criticized France for withholding recognition of the Ulbricht regime. In contrast to genuine West German efforts to seek more normal relations in Europe, the East Germans have unleashed a vitriolic propaganda campaign and have dropped former calls for reunification, now maintaining that a "Socialist" state can never merge with "capitalist-militarist" West Germany.

Meanwhile, East Germany has increased its efforts to gain recognition by third world states, e.g., it has reportedly offered a sizable credit to Algeria in exchange for at least consular representation. At the same time, however, its representatives abroad continue to be exposed for their attempts to subvert the very governments which East Berlin is ostensibly wooing, e.g., last year the official East German news agency (ADN) correspondent in Kenya was declared persona non grata for his dealings with Kenyan leftists, and the ADN correspondent in Ghana was expelled for subversive and other activities incompatible with his journalist's status.


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1103.

SOUTH VIETNAM'S CONSTITUTIONAL

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GROWING PAINS



\* \* \* \* \*

SITUATION: In early 1965 the political and social fabric of SVN was on the verge of dissolution, with Catholic against Buddhist and the Army in poor repute. Today there is a relatively stable albeit military government in Saigon and a draft constitution is just around the corner.


This constitution is being written by a constituent Assembly of 117 delegates who were popularly elected in September 1966 in a remarkably large (80%) and orderly voter turnout. The election was a triumph for the hard-pressed Ky government, but the primary test will be whether the military and the assembly, in the midst of war, can finally compromise their differences, produce a scheme for an elected government, proceed to presidential and legislative elections and then effect a peaceful transfer of power.

The success of the Constituent Assembly is especially important for two reasons:

a. It will enable the South Vietnamese government to develop into a popularly elected body which will present a favorable image abroad for those who see no particular virtue in the present military dictatorship.

b. It will make the South Vietnamese government a more attractive alternative to those elements of the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front who are not hard-core Communists.

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


27 February 1967

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1104.

# HEALTH PROBLEMS IN THE USSR



SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) The USSR is experiencing an influenza epidemic for the third year in a row and for at least the 6th time in the last 11 years. The nation's health services have not been able to contain and minimize the effects of the 1967 outbreak. Such a failure is significant in the light of recent revelations that the 1965 influenza epidemic caused approximately 100,000 deaths, a misfortune which would have induced most governments to take vigorous preventive measures.

Some of the causes of the more frequent and more severe epidemics in the USSR cannot be eliminated in the short run. For example, extremely crowded conditions in housing\*, bus and subway transportation, and at work sites make it difficult to isolate the sick from the well. Furthermore, the Soviet diet, though substantial in calories, is low in fruit, vegetables, meat, and dairy products and thus (particularly from fall until spring) provides insufficient vitamins for many citizens. Solutions to these problems are far from imminent.

It was, however, within the Soviets' power to moderate the 1967 epidemic by forecasting the onset and area of the disease and providing the populace with mass immunization against influenza. But the Soviets had placed too great reliance on a nasal spray immunization which, in spite of the reams of publicity given it in 1962 and 1963, was found after large-scale trials to be ineffective. A. Smorodintsev, a leading Soviet virologist writing in PRAVDA of 16 January 1967, blames the Government for failing to provide equipment for research on and production of an effective influenza vaccine. In belated recognition of the

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\*According to T. Sosnovy, an American expert on Soviet housing, there were an average of 2.33 occupants per room in the USSR in 1965. The average living space per person (in terms of living rooms and bedrooms) in the Russians Republic in 1965 was 6.6 square meters, or an area approximately 10 ft. x 7 ft. (source: S.A. Alekseyev, "The Economics of Housing [(Ekonomika Zhilishchnogo Khozyaystva)], Moscow, 1966). This compares with the USSR's "sanitary norm" of 9 square meters (96.8 square feet) of living space.

~~SECRET~~

(1104 Cont.)

need and the possibility of combatting influenza, the USSR recently announced plans to build an influenza institute in Leningrad where 500 scientists are expected to be doing research on all respiratory diseases.

The Soviets' mishandling of the influenza problem calls for an examination of the over-all situation of health care in the USSR, especially in the light of the above-cited Soviet claims to superiority in this sphere. Evidence, both from Soviet sources and from visiting foreign experts, reveals that Soviet medical practices and services are mediocre, and that Soviet medical technology lags far behind the West's. Furthermore, Soviet medical research has not produced a single finding worthy of any major international award. The bases for these conclusions are given in the unclassified attachment, which contains further information on the influenza epidemics and a survey of some major aspects of Soviet health care, such as: number and quality of doctors, adequacy of facilities, quality of instruments, administration, effectiveness of medical treatment, medical research, pharmaceutical production, and sanitation problems.

Not to be ignored is the Soviets' frequent assertion that their Government provides the entire range of medical care free of charge to all Soviet citizens. This is true, except that there are some "poly-clinics" where fees are charged and where a person can choose his doctor according to his own taste and judgment. Such polyclinics, according to an 8 Dec 66 article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, are extremely popular. (Probably, though the article does not so imply, only with the better-off Soviet citizens). The writers of the article propose that fees should also be charged for a new kind of nursing home in order to fill a gap in the state's care of the chronically sick or disabled. Perhaps this germ of an idea will spread. The very advancing of this proposal, at any rate, suggests that Soviet citizens are not fully satisfied with their routine health care. Those suffering from influenza this winter can hardly be any less dissatisfied with the Government's job in caring for what now appears to be a routine yearly epidemic.

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\*For example, between 1901-25 (scientists of Russia/USSR were awarded 4% of all Nobel Laureates in medicine and physiology, the same share as US scientists were awarded. Between 1926-66, however, no Soviet was awarded such a prize; US scientists in these spheres were awarded 68% of the Nobel Laureates in 1946-65.

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References:

Hospital Services in the USSR (report of the U.S. delegation on hospital systems planning, June 26-July 16, 1965): not for attribution

World Health Organization Bulletin, Vol 34, #6, 1966

N.Y. TIMES  
27 January 1967

## Soviet Said to Refuse to Back East Germany on Bonn's Ties

CPYRGHT

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Jan. 26 — Observers

of Communist countries' Affairs think that the Soviet Union may have declined to support East Germany's efforts to block the West German drive for establishing diplomatic ties in East Europe.

The East German Government suddenly resorted to public warnings and implicit attacks against allied Communist governments last evening.

The sources reported that the Soviet leadership was preoccupied by its difficulties with Communist China and wished to avoid causing new points of friction between its European Communist allies. Noting that four Eastern European countries were interested in diplomatic relations with West Germany, the sources declared, the Russians decided to stay out of the matter.

Yesterday the East German Foreign Ministry issued a declaration warning East European governments against "legalizing" the Bonn Government's "aggressive and expansionist program" by accepting diplomatic relations with it.

The 300-word declaration also indirectly criticized Rumania for receiving a West German Government delegation last fall and for her decision to send Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu to Bonn next week.

Today a spokesman for Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger's coalition Government declared that Mr. Manescu's visit would conclude with an agreement to exchange ambassadors between Bonn and Bucharest.

While Neues Deutschland, the official East German Communist newspaper, was preparing to carry the Foreign Ministry declaration, Scinteia, the Rumanian party organ, was sending to press an editorial hailing the forthcoming diplomatic ties with Bonn.

This, according to a report from Bucharest, was prominently displayed in today's edition. Today also, Rolf Lahr, State Secretary in the West German Foreign Ministry and Bonn's special envoy, returned from Budapest with the prophecy that Hungary would be the second East European country, after Rumania, to exchange embassies with West Germany.

East European observers were especially pleased by this report since it was a further indication that the Kiesinger Government wished to avoid playing off one Communist government against another.

Rumania and Hungary have sharp differences on a variety of issues, not the least of which is policy toward the Soviet Union.

### Repeated Warnings Given

Prior to yesterday's East Berlin declaration, envoys of the regime of Walter Ulbricht accredited to East European capitals repeatedly warned their host governments against Bonn's diplomatic initiatives.

Communist sources said last week in Budapest that similar East German interventions had also occurred at the party level between representatives of the foreign-party relations department.

The representations were said to have included demands that the East European allies demonstrate "absolute solidarity with the [East] German Democratic Republic" against West Germany and insistence on respect for the "prestige" of the Ulbricht regime.

The West German academic exchange service reported today that it had greatly enlarged its invitation program for East European scholars.

The service disclosed that the program had expanded 10 times since 1963 and that last year 339 East European scholars spent two or three months

of study in West Germany, while 173 more came for shorter periods under sponsorship of the service. Czechoslovakia sent the largest number.

### East Germans Score France

Special to The New York Times

BERLIN, Jan. 26 — The East Germans attacked France today for not recognizing their Communist regime and warned that this could impair efforts to achieve a European relaxation of tension.

The new Communist move fit into a pattern of activity aimed at retaining for East Germany the status of a Sovereign and separate state in a tide of transition in Europe.

Neues Deutschland, the Communist party newspaper, carried pages of declarations of loyalty by East Germans under the headline "No unification is possible between our Socialist fatherland and the capitalist Federal Republic."

In its attack on France the paper said the French refusal to recognize East Germany "is in drastic contrast with the programmatic declarations by the French President in favor of a détente between East and West."

Dispatch transmitted by the East German news agency ADN 26 January:

Berlin--NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, the leading newspaper of the GDR, remarks on Thursday, commenting on a statement by French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, that the absence of settled relations between France and the GDR must be described as anomalous. In his broadcast Couve de Murville presented embarrassing subterfuges concerning his reserved attitude in regard to normal relations with the GDR.

No state must be excluded from cooperation for peace and security, the newspaper says, 'a truth which has been repeatedly stated by President Charles de Gaulle.' The absence of diplomatic relations "is not in accord with the state of economic and cultural relations between the two countries." French inconsistency in diplomatically recognizing European socialist countries, but not the GDR, "is in sharp contrast to the programmatic statements by the French President concerning tension between East and West."

The paper adds that French policy in recent years undoubtedly deserves appreciation for its realism. "That this policy is incomplete and inconsistent on one important point is detrimental to general European interests, as well as to cooperation between France and the GDR."

THE ECONOMIST (London)  
28 January 1967

CPYRGHT

### *Germany and Eastern Europe*

## Push it out and see if it floats

FROM OUR BONN CORRESPONDENT

News of visiting mayors from foreign parts ordinarily passes through one ear and out of the other. Yet not when it concerns the four Rumanians—from Bucharest, Brasov, Ploesti and Timisoara—who arrived in west Germany on January 20th. They are being welcomed as especially heartening phenomena. For back home their rulers seem to be showing a much more amiable interest than those of other east European countries in what Herr Kiesinger described last week as the "little ships of good will" which the west German government is busily launching in eastern waters.

On Thursday the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition cabinet (east German propaganda calls it the Kiesinger-Strauss coalition) swallowed a hefty chunk of those scruples that have taken shape hitherto in the Hallstein doctrine. It agreed that west Germany should grasp the approaching opportunity of establishing normal diplomatic relations with Rumania, notwithstanding Rumania's full recognition of the east German regime.

If neither side changes its mind, Bonn and Bucharest will undertake to elevate their respective trade missions into full-blown embassies when the Rumanian foreign minister, Mr Coreliu Manescu, is in Bonn next week. He is expected to arrive on Monday. Mr Manescu was invited last September by the then German federal minister for economics during talks in Bucharest. These were so promising that

a delegation was sent to Bucharest on January 7th to continue soundings. It reported encouragingly on January 16th: Rumania's price was not recognition of east Germany and of the Oder-Neisse frontier; what it wanted was chiefly more trade.

Naturally the rewards of closer economic collaboration with west Germany are much before the eyes of eastern Europe, and Bonn knows it. Herr Rolf Lahr, the state secretary at the foreign ministry who specialises in economic questions, spent three days in Budapest this week, primarily discussing trade possibilities. But he was also trying to persuade the Hungarians to promote business relations into diplomatic ones. By Thursday it had not become clear in Bonn how far he had succeeded—he may hardly know yet himself—but it did not seem that the Hungarians were setting exorbitant political conditions. Nor is it reckoned that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in their present mood, would discourage Bonn from further shedding of the Hallstein doctrine.

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Poland and Czechoslovakia, too, would like more trade. But, having a common frontier with Germany, both are influenced by considerations of security, that can be and are usefully given highly righteous ideological expression. Warsaw, which has consistently played even its commercial dealings with Bonn pronouncedly cool, shows no sign yet of meeting Herr Kiesinger an inch of the way. And Prague, where German foreign ministry scouts were reconnoitring again last week, is still using the status of west Berlin and of people directly affected by the Munich agreement as awkward bargaining counters. In theory Czechoslovakia has no official trade relations with west Germany. In practice there is an office in Frankfurt manned by "representatives of Czechoslovak foreign trade companies."

There is no illusion in Bonn that the exercise of "normal diplomatic relations" will automatically engender sweetness and light between the practitioners. But it is held that, given the right men and the right policies, it may help to reduce antagonisms, and in the long run to bring the Germans a stage nearer to being given

the choice of living together in one state. Bonn's moves have visibly shaken the ill-founded east German regime's peace of mind. Herr Ulbricht promptly despatched his foreign minister, Herr Winzer, to Moscow, and his deputy foreign minister to Prague. His terms for humbling the "revanchists and neo-Nazis of Bonn" include *de jure* recognition of his own regime and of the Oder-Neisse frontier, and renunciation of all nuclear pretensions. It is just possible that with Moscow's support he may persuade his seemingly softening partners to steel their hearts once more. A fierce statement on Wednesday showed that he is doing his best.

Herr Brandt told the Council of Europe on Tuesday that the Russians did not for the time being want to discuss German unity. He should know. He has had several frank talks lately with the Russian ambassador to east Berlin. But the more the west Germans extend their contacts, the more encouraged they are to find how little credibility and sympathy the shrill east German regime has won for itself.

TIME Magazine  
17 February 1967

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## EASTERN EUROPE

### Pattern of Disintegration

Unabashedly chauvinistic, the peoples of Eastern Europe have always been bitterly quarrelsome. During more than 20 years in power, their Communist leaders have tried to make much of socialist unity, but the effort created only a patina beneath which the old animosities still raged. Last week the patina visibly cracked. When the representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries met, they argued vociferously and unproductively. The fiasco proved with new force what has been clear for a long time: the Warsaw Pact, somewhat like its NATO equivalent, is now an artifact rather than a fact.

The backdrop for the meeting was Rumania's decision to break the Eastern European deepfreeze on diplomatic relations with Bonn, which is aggressively seeking new ties to the East (TIME, Jan. 27). Alarmed by Rumanian recognition of the hated Bonn regime and fearful that the whole socialist camp might too quickly follow suit, East Germany's Walter Ulbricht demanded that the Eastern Europeans come to a conclave in East Berlin. The meeting had to be shifted to Warsaw when Rumania bridled at Ulbricht's criticism of its move and refused to come to his city.

Rumanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu sent an underling to Warsaw, went off for a leisurely week of discussions in Brussels, where he boldly proclaimed that a bloc like Eastern Europe has become an "anachronism left over from the time of the cold war."

According to leaks from the supposedly secret Warsaw meeting (among those present: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who decided not to accompany Premier Kosygin to Britain in order to attend), the Poles and East Germans urged their neighbors to stop an unseemly rush to Bonn. If they must establish relations, ran the advice, they at least ought to support East Germany in rejecting Bonn's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the German people. The pleas did not have much effect, and the communiqué issued at the meeting's end was so bland that it did not even mention the central issue of Germany. The Warsaw meeting revealed an intriguing pattern of disintegration in what used to be the Communist bloc.

► Russia, which is having enough troubles with Red China, is angry at the Ulbricht regime for its attack on Rumania, which forced the transfer of the meeting and embarrassed the Soviet leadership.  
► East Germany is furious at the Rumanians for 1) recognizing West Germany, 2) robbing Ulbricht of the pres-

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tige of an East Berlin meeting, and 3) making fun of his regime in its press.

► Rumania is equally furious at the East Germans for 1) making a direct attack on its government, 2) washing the socialist camp's dirty linen in public, and 3) adopting the general attitude that all socialist foreign policy must be aimed at pleasing Ulbricht.

► Hungary is chagrined at the East Germans and the Poles for creating a commotion over the issue and thus making it more difficult for Budapest to go ahead (as it wants to) and recognize West Germany.

► Czechoslovakia is alarmed at the

signs of tension within the alliance, and irked that, to keep on good terms with East Germany, it now must re-examine its intention to open diplomatic relations with Bonn.

► Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary resent the Soviet Union's pointed reminder last week that they were on the Nazi side during World War II and had only the Soviet Union to thank for escaping "harsh Allied treatment."

► Poland feels reduced and abandoned amid the general movement toward Bonn. Except for Ulbricht & Co., the Poles alone retain the East Bloc's old anti-West German spirit.

WASHINGTON STAR

18 February 1967

## *Bucharest and Bonn*

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Romania has demonstrated once again that the unity of Europe's Communist countries is more mythical than real. In varying degrees, these one-time servile satellites of the Kremlin are divided among themselves, and acting separately, on issues that affect them all. The latest example involves the question of East Germany's status and the establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany.

Responding to the initiatives of the "grand coalition" headed by Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt, Romania has agreed to an exchange of ambassadors and a normalization of all ties with the new Bonn government. The reaction from Walter Ulbricht's Communist East German regime has been a shrill statement condemning Bucharest's "deplorable" decision. And Bucharest, in reply, has castigated this criticism as the work of "reactionary circles who are cold-war advocates trying to poison international relations."

What bothers Ulbricht is that the Romanians have worked out their agreement with Bonn without challenging Bonn's claim that it is the sole legal representative of the entire German people, East and West. Ulbricht's argument is that all members of the seven-nation

Warsaw Pact—East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union—are on record as being committed to the idea that the West Germans must meet two basic conditions before relations with them can be normalized: (1) Bonn must recognize Poland's present borders, which embrace prewar German territory and (2) it must accept East Germany's legitimacy as a separate state.

These conditions have been completely ignored by the Romanians, who have already declared themselves as believing that the Warsaw Pact should be dissolved. There are indications, moreover, that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria would like to follow the Bucharest lead. And the Russians, of course, though protesting against West Germany's "absurd" legitimacy claims, intend to continue maintaining the diplomatic relations they have long had with Bonn. Only Poland seems unreservedly in support of Ulbricht's plaintive position.

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Warsaw Pact people displayed considerable confusion, hesitancy and noncommunicativeness at their meeting last week to discuss the problem.



NEW STATESMAN (London)  
10 February 1967

CPYRGHT

## Crisis in the Warsaw Pact

GABRIEL LORINCE

While Mr Kosygin has been continuing the East-West dialogue in London, the other member of the Kremlin leadership team, Leonid Brezhnev, has been making strenuous efforts to patch up a growing rift in the Warsaw Pact. Rumania's flat refusal to attend a meeting of Pact foreign ministers in East Berlin, following recent East German public criticism of Bucharest's decision to send a minister to Bonn, for the first time laid bare the depth of the division and the clash in interests between the northern and southern 'tiers' of the communist alliance. East Germany, Poland and Russia, incensed by Rumania's flagrant disregard for common policies towards West Germany and frightened by the Hungarian and Bulgarian flirting with Bonn, called a meeting for last Monday to sort out the differences threatening the alliance.

*Neues Deutschland*, the East German Communist Party organ, saw fit to chide the Rumanians over the weekend for the trend of their foreign policy and to lecture them on internationalist duties. Not unexpectedly, the Rumanians reacted violently to the East German charges. *Scanteia*, the Rumanian Communist Party newspaper, openly accused East Germany of interference in the affairs of another socialist country and remarked that East Berlin's stand 'on Bucharest-Bonn relations 'accords with the attitude of reactionary circles, which are followers of the cold war and strive to poison inter-state relations'. Subsequently, Bucharest refused to send a delegation to the East Berlin meeting. After hurried high-level consultations, the meeting was transferred to Warsaw, where it is scheduled to open this weekend. Meanwhile Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party leader, paid a surprise visit to Prague to work out, with Czech help, a not too damaging compromise course between the northern and southern members of the alliance.

Although the establishment of West German-Rumanian diplomatic relations has, apparently, brought the simmering crisis of the Warsaw Pact alliance to the boil, it did not create the underlying stresses and clashing national interests. Already last summer the Rumanian party leader Nicolae Ceausescu had raised the question of the cost of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany, asked for more command posts for non-Soviet generals and demanded a bigger say on the deployment and possible use of nuclear weapons. These 'Gaullist' demands were bitterly resented by the

members, less afraid of a German military revival, made cautiously approving noises.

Further, Ceausescu's suggestion that all military blocs should be abolished was countered by Soviet attempts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact by closer integration of military forces. Nonetheless the Rumanian moves towards greater independence and the revision of the military blocs in Europe have, in fact, helped to start a disintegration trend in the Warsaw Pact not dissimilar to De Gaulle's Nato-busting, if on a different scale. But it is exactly these trends which have made the East Germans, Poles and, to a certain extent, the Czechs more intransigent, as they fear that the weakening of the Warsaw Pact's military strength would leave them prey to a 'revenge-seeking' Bonn. Rumania's aspirations to independence have thus proved to be *against* the interests of several other member nations.

The Poles bitterly resent Rumania's unilateral action over diplomatic relations with Bonn and fear that Hungary and Bulgaria will follow their economic interests without insisting on West German concessions on vital issues, such as the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, recognition of East Germany and renunciation of nuclear arms. Official Warsaw has refrained from public invective, but privately it has made abundantly clear what it thought of 'the gesture of a country which was Hitler's ally until 1944'. Polish newspapers have confined themselves to calls for a common East European policy towards Bonn, but, precisely because of the ease with which West Germany's diplomatic drive eastwards succeeded, there is a feeling of isolation and weariness in Warsaw.

Polish officials, who reportedly agreed to support Russia's call for an anti-Chinese international communist conference in exchange for a firm Soviet stand against East European recognition of Bonn, are understood to be disappointed over the hesitant and ineffective Soviet posture on this question, so vital for Poland. But the Soviet position on ties with Bonn is complicated by the fact that Moscow has recognised both East Berlin and Bonn and could hardly deny the same right to the Rumanians or Hungarians. Thus Russia has to confine herself to questions of European security and the problems of unity within the socialist camp in the present round of exchanges with Bucharest, Sofia and Budapest. Moscow's decision to allow the West German offensive to take its course is also believed to be due to Soviet reluctance to

at a time when Soviet-Chinese relations are nearing breaking-point.

The Rumanian independence moves and the ensuing disarray among Pact member-countries have left East Germany, with its vested interest in the status quo, alarmingly isolated and in a dangerous mood. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, has suddenly become the key country in the eyes of the Russians and the northern and southern tier nations alike. Because of their bitter wartime experiences, the Czechs are unlikely to follow Bucharest's lead in establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn without trying to wring some serious political concessions from the West Germans, such as the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and some *modus vivendi* with East Germany.

After the recent exploratory talks between Prague and Bonn, Czechoslovak officials said they still held the view, despite Bucharest's precipitate action, that West Germany would have to meet certain ad-

vance conditions before there could be talk of diplomatic ties. Prague's ostentatious declaration of loyalty was, however, somewhat softened by the very fact that it *did* accept Bonn's overtures to explore the possibilities of normalising relations between the two countries. Enlightened economic self-interest, the main force behind the present rift within the communist camp, will in the long run prove stronger in Prague, too, than fraternal duty towards fellow communist nations.

As the division deepens between the northern hard-liners, gathering around the East Berlin-Warsaw axis, and the southern doves, the Rumanians continue to loosen the alliance. Removing the legacies of the Second World War, initiating better relations, talks and trade with nations of differing social order are not Russian prerogatives, they claim. That is what peaceful co-existence is about. But they still have to convince their colleagues in Warsaw.

N.Y. TIMES

21 February 1967

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## East German Regime Widens Breach With Bonn

Special to The New York Times  
BERLIN, Feb. 20 —

East Germany widened the division of Germany today by introducing separate "nationality of the German Democratic Republic" for the 17 million East Germans.

In adopting the nationality bill, the East German Volkskammer (Parliament) scrapped the legal concept of German nationality that existed in both East Germany and West Germany. Under the bill, East Germans will no longer be known as German, but as "citizens of the G.D.R."

The bill, passed unanimously in the presence of Walter Ulbricht, the head of state, also laid claim to millions of refugees who have fled East Germany since the Communist state was founded on Oct. 7, 1949.

The opening paragraph of the bill stipulates that German nationals who resided on the territory of East Germany on Oct. 7, 1949, "are citizens of the G.D.R. no matter where they reside at present."

### Fleeing Is a Crime

It was not clear whether the East Germans would try to enforce their claim whenever they

get hold of a former refugee. Under East German laws, it is a punishable crime to flee the country or to leave illegally by way of a third country.

The Communists, in view of widespread moves for a European détente, are thought to fear that forces from within and without could combine to exercise pressure on Mr. Ulbricht's regime to yield to some form of German settlement along Western terms.

In the West it is felt that the vast majority of East Germans consider themselves "German" rather than "citizens of the G.D.R." Reacting to the East German bill, the West Berlin city government declared, "Germans remain Germans."

### Renaming Expected

According to reports from East Germany, the regime plans to rename the state the "Socialist German Democratic Republic" at the Communist party convention scheduled for April. The term "Socialist," already used regularly by East German leaders in connection with the G.D.R., was seen to imply a constant reminder to the world, and to the Soviet Union in particular, of East Germany's integration in the orbit of the Soviet Union's "socialist camp."

In another bill today, the East Germans laid claim to what they described as their "continental shelf" in the Baltic Sea and reserved the right to exploit, use and research the shelf for possible gas or oil reservoirs.

The unilateral step could bring difficulties with East Germany's neighbors, West Germany and Poland as well as with Denmark and Sweden, a country to which the shelf extends across the Baltic.

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"VOLUNTARY" AND FORCED

LABOR IN CUBA

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SITUATION: Although the basic facts on forced labor in Cuba have been published in the Free World press, they have most often been presented in bits and pieces and, as a result, the subject has not received the propaganda attention it merits. For if two prime hallmarks of Communist tyranny are a secret police and "thought control," the third is certainly compulsory labor, forcing large parts of the citizenry to work in undesirable jobs without adequate compensation.

Compulsory labor in Cuba is backed by varying degrees of force. The strongest coercion is applied to the prison inmates. Some of them are ordinary criminals and they are obliged to perform prison labor, as in every country. Others are political prisoners, some imprisoned without trial, others duly tried and convicted for what can only be defined as political crimes. These political prisoners live under extreme privation and are forced to do hard physical labor, primarily on farms.

The second degree of forced labor is exemplified by the "Military Units for Aid to Production" (UMAP), which are army battallions composed of "social misfits" (priests, religious militants, drug addicts, homosexuals, etc.) who are drafted into service for three years to be "educated and transformed into useful members of society." During their service they are virtual prisoners, forced to perform 14-16 hours of punishing labor each day.

Finally, a large number of Cubans is dragooned into agricultural work, mostly on the sugar cane plantations. While not compelled by police or draft, the farm workers "volunteer" rather than face the many economic and social sanctions which the regime will otherwise mount against them.

Women are not exempt from forced labor. They are being recruited by the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC) and sent to work camps already in operation in Camaguey Province, and women's units are an integral part of the "voluntary" farm worker brigades. Moreover, Castro has announced that a nationwide system of full-time nurseries and boarding schools is being established to free women for production and agricultural work ... and to separate the children from the possibly "corrupting influence" of their parents.

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February 1967

"Voluntary" and Forced Labor in Cuba

Compulsory labor seems to be as much of a hallmark of Communism as secret police and "thought control." Cuban Communism is no exception. Compulsory labor in Cuba closely follows the patterns established by older Communist regimes, especially the Soviet Union and Communist China. As in those countries, there are varying degrees of force backing the varying types of obligatory labor in Cuba, ranging from social and economic pressures to outright imprisonment.

The strongest coercion is applied to prison inmates. Some of them are common criminals who are obliged to perform prison labor as in other countries around the world. However, there are also many political prisoners in Cuban jails, some imprisoned without trial, others duly tried and convicted for what can only be defined as political crimes -- such as daring to criticize the leaders of the Communist Party. These prisoners live under conditions of extreme privation and hardship -- conditions which in our century have existed only under the harshest dictatorships.

Not only do the prisoners live in squalid quarters, brutally mistreated by the guards, but they are forced to labor each day in the fields, cutting and weeding sugar cane, planting, cultivating and harvesting other crops, and performing other equally difficult labor for up to 16 hours a day. The conditions have been testified to by numerous refugees who have escaped Cuba. Sad to say, the plight of these prisoners has not attracted the sympathy it deserves beyond the immediate circle of persons closely interested in Cuban affairs.

A new form of compulsory labor was established in Cuba with the creation of the "Military Units for Aid to Production" (Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Produccion - UMAP) in November 1965, more aptly described as forced labor camps. While it is not possible to give an exact figure on the number of persons thus far interned in such camps, the most recent estimates range from 25,000 to 30,000. It was announced early in 1967 that the number of UMAP camps will soon be doubled. The camps are composed of approximately 120 conscripts, with four camps composing a battalion. The prisoners are what the Cuban Communist regime calls "social misfits": priests, religious militants (especially members of some of the more fundamentalist sects such as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Pentecostal Church), petty thieves and dope addicts, homosexuals, and those who have displayed an "incorrect attitude" toward "the Revolution." (According to recent refugees the people sneeringly refer to this as "the crime of revolutionary apathy.") Among other activities, requesting a passport is interpreted as displaying an "incorrect attitude" and as a consequence many applicants for exit visas immediately lose their jobs and are sent to the UMAP camps until it is their turn to leave on the daily refugee flights to the United States.

The inmates are drafted into service for three years. Since the camps are now only a year old, however, it is not certain that the internees will in fact be discharged at the end of three years.

The stated objective of the UMAP, according to the Castro regime, is "to educate and transform the conscripts into useful members of society." The regime hopes to accomplish this by "sacrifice" (according to the Marxist theory of education through work), by indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism during daily classes, and by violence if necessary. Another -- though unstated -- objective of the UMAP is to create battalions of laborers to do agricultural work for minimum pay.

The UMAP camps are now the prime topic of conversation of the exiles arriving daily in Miami, Florida. Since many of them have personally served in the camps, it is possible to gain an accurate view of conditions there. According to these refugees, conditions vary among the camps, some being more harsh than others, largely dependent on the whim of the camp director, who is usually an army lieutenant. A typical daily regime, according to the refugees, would be:

0400	Reveille
0410	Breakfast (hot water sweetened with sugar)
0430	Agricultural labor
1130	Lunch (thin soup or beans with one half of a boiled banana)
1230	Agricultural labor
1830	Supper (beans, one slice of pressed meat, half of a boiled banana)
1930-2130	"Indoctrination" class

The prisoners live in wooden barracks without furnishings except perhaps canvas or burlap hammocks, without running water, in extremely unsanitary conditions. The compounds in which the barracks are located are surrounded by barbed wire fences, six to ten feet tall. Armed guards are posted at all times and they are instructed to shoot anyone attempting to escape from the compound. The inmates' families are usually allowed to visit them once a month, provided they have not infringed any of the rules of the camp. After a lengthy trial period, and provided that they have not been in any trouble in the camp, the inmates are permitted a leave of 10 days to visit their families; however there are wide variations in this matter and in some of the camps there is practically no leave. UMAP conscripts are paid the extravagant sum of 7 pesos a month -- again, if they stay out of trouble.

Typical employment of the UMAP conscript labor battalions includes: planting, weeding, fertilizing, cutting and processing sugar cane, beans, rice, tobacco, bananas, and other fruits and vegetables; reforestation;

cutting trees and processing them for lumber; repairing, patching, and extending roads; and digging trenches near coastal areas.

The Cuban army also uses its regular draftees who are performing their Compulsory Military Service (Servicio Militar Obligatorio -- SMO) for agricultural labor; and the regular draftees are also only paid 7 pesos per month. However these draftees receive military training and do perform normal military duties when they are not being employed in agriculture. The difference between SMO duty and UMAP duty, as noted by one refugee who reached Florida, is that if one gets into trouble while serving in the SMO units he is sentenced to prison, whereas in the UMAP he is sentenced to further time in the UMAP! In a speech on 30 January 1967 Fidel Castro referred to the "tens of thousands of soldiers" who are doing agricultural work this year and stated that "next year it will have to be a general order. The greater part of the men in the armed forces will join in."

Although the prison laborers, the UMAP conscripts and the army draftees provide a fixed source of manpower for the Castro regime, an even larger supply of laborers is the so-called "volunteer" battalions who perform the major part of agricultural work, this being essentially sugar cane harvesting. These workers range from "permanent volunteers" to schoolchildren. For several reasons the regime has concentrated principally on the nation's youth in building up this labor force. The first reason is that the youth have not yet become essential elements in the country's economic apparatus and can be sent to work in the fields without too seriously disrupting the economy. Secondly, the work is so hard that youth produce more than older citizens. Perhaps most importantly, Castro desires to separate the youth from their families, social background, religion, and other "remnants of the past," in order to remake them entirely in the Communist mold. He inaugurated on 29 January 1967 a new scheme to take children from their mothers at the age of one month and place them in special nurseries during the day. Later they will go to boarding schools, returning to their families only on the weekends. Castro said that these boys and girls will devote 50 percent of their time to study, 30 percent to productive work, and 20 percent to physical education, sports, and recreational activities. Vacations will be completely organized and controlled by the state.

The students sent to the fields come from the technical, secondary and preparatory schools, as well as from the universities. In a speech on February 20, 1967, Fidel Castro bragged that the target figure of 40,000 students from the technical schools alone, which had been set for 1970, will now be met in 1968. The new goal for 1970, he indicated, will be 100,000.

The non-student youth of Cuba are being forced into "volunteering" for two year's service in agricultural work. This campaign is being organized by the Union of Young Communists. The alternative for the Cuban youth is a three-year hitch in the UMAP.

Although the emphasis is on the employment of youth, older persons are also widely used. An effort has been made to establish "reserve battalions" among the Cuban workers, which can be sent to the cane fields during harvest time (up to six months). This, of course, seriously disrupts the economy and has been opposed by managers of state enterprises who are responsible for meeting production quotas set by the government. Typical of the problems caused by this mass mobilization is the impressment of 20,000 workers in the construction industry into sugar cane cutting ... despite the acknowledged shortage of 1 million homes.

Women are not exempt from obligatory labor in Cuba. Castro recently acknowledged a plan for drafting more women into agriculture -- 15,000 to be added to the "permanent volunteers" and over 100,000 for the completion of special tasks. The "volunteering" will be made easier by the plans for communal nurseries and boarding schools. The president of the Cuban Federation of Women, Vilma Espin, stated that the plan for enlarging the agricultural labor force was a step towards the "full emancipation" of women. Even more ominous were reports from refugees that feminine equivalents of the UMAP camps are being built, to be called "Unidades Femeninas para Ayuda a la Produccion."

One conclusion indicated by Castro's impressment of so many workers is that the Cuban economy is in severe straits. It is already heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for more than one million dollars per day in outright aid. The impression grows that this does not suffice, but that the Soviets are balking at granting larger sums. Castro is therefore trying to compensate for the bungling and mismanagement of the economy by desperation measures. Indeed the economy has apparently reached the point where it can only be saved by the schoolchildren. Such is the impression left by the announcement of the Provincial Education Director of Cuba's Matanzas Province on 5 January that 8,000 children in that province will have their studies interrupted for six weeks during February and March so that they can help with the harvest. The Director said that sweet potatoes, potatoes, yucca, squash, and other secondary crops could not be harvested without the children's help!



CPYRGHT

THE WASHINGTON POST  
Monday, Jan. 30, 1967

# Viet Assembly Puts Stress on Stable Regime

By Chalmers M. Roberts  
Washington Post Staff Writer

SAIGON, Jan. 29 — There

are 117 of them and they are meeting daily now in the cavernous white one-time opera house built by the French in 1892.

These are the men—with one woman among them—who were elected last September to draft a constitution so that this nation now so divided by war and politics can have an elected government.

The delegates to the Constituent Assembly sit in seven rows of leather chairs behind broad desks facing the podium, behind which hangs a massive South Vietnamese flag—three red stripes lengthwise on a yellow field. The average age is 41.

Delegates come to the podium to speak their pieces into a microphone and Chairman Phan Khac Suu, himself a former chief of state, is not very strict about the time though he is about the germaneness rule.

## Touchy Questions Come Up

So far the decorum has been exemplary but last evening—they now meet from 3 to 8 p.m. to allow for caucuses in the mornings—the issue was touchy and some delegates were shouting into the mike so loudly they were difficult to understand.

Last night's passion related to the central problem of the Constituent Assembly: how to create the framework of a civilian government in the midst of power that is in the hands of a military Directorate. They were now debating the future role of the military in civilian politics. In the end there were barely enough votes to approve a provision saying that "military personnel on active duty may not take part in politics."

Even more touchy questions

about the future role of the military remain to be decided. But the bulk of the Assemblymen, it is evident from interviews at length with several of them, are determined to find compromises which will avoid a confrontation with the military Directory which today in fact rules this nation and on whose goodwill depends the hoped for transition to something that can be called an elected government.

## Democracy Is Aim

"What we need is an elected government, not necessarily a civilian government," says Dang Van Sung, editor and publisher of the most influential Vietnamese daily. "To defeat the Vietcong," he adds, "we must have a visible elected government with appeal to the people and we must separate the non-Communists among the Vietcong from the hard-core Communists by adopting their platform on land reform and against corruption."

"A stable democratic government" is the aim of 34-year-old Nguyen Van Ngai, who is the floor leader of the Greater People's bloc, the largest in the Assembly.

"Most important," says Nguyen Huu Thong, a 34-year-old lawyer who fled from Hanoi with part of his family in 1954, "in psychological warfare here is for the people to feel they can set their own future and not have an imposed government."

"Another coup would be terrible," says Dr. Phan Quang Dan, who like perhaps a score of other Assemblymen was jailed during the Ngo Dinh Diem regime.

## Hopes For Compromises

Dan is an optimist. He believes that compromises with the military directorate can be worked out to avoid a confrontation and crisis. And even if a military man, having shed his uniform, becomes the elected President, as many observers think will be the case, the new legislature being created by the Assembly will have important powers of check and balance.

## Organized in Blocs

Perhaps half of the Assemblymen have had meaningful political experience at the national, provincial or local level. Most of them have organized in blocs. But these blocs are based more on personal relationships than policy agreements and despite caucuses the bloc members generally split up when the time comes to vote by a show of hands.

One of the trickiest problems is how to see that a two-party system emerges and delegates often ask foreigners for suggestions on how to legislate such an end. But nobody seems really to have an answer as yet. Perhaps there is a clue in the current regrouping of the Assembly blocs into more conservative and more liberal groups.

What is taking place in the old opera house is indeed the thin wedge of democracy. Probably no comparison to the American experience is really valid, but if any is, the Vietnamese Assembly resembles more the writing of the Articles of Confederation during the American Revolution than of the Constitution after peace had come.

The present military government of Chief of State

Nguyen Van Thieu, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and their Directory colleagues has been in power now for 18 months and has just weathered what seems like a minor crisis in the dismissal of the Defense Minister.

But the big test lies ahead: whether the military and the Assemblymen, in the midst of war, can finally compromise their differences, produce a scheme for an elected government, proceed to presidential and legislative elections and then effect a peaceful transfer of power.

VIETNAM TODAY—the third of four articles by MICHAEL WALL

*Assembly not a puppet for Marshal Ky*

One physical change made in Saigon since I was there nine months ago has been the erection of a vast and extraordinarily ugly statue of two Vietnamese soldiers advancing, with guns at the ready, as if about to storm the National Assembly on the other side of the city's main square.

It will be added tragedy for South Vietnam if in fact there is a clash during the coming year between the military leadership and the fledgling Constituent Assembly which is trying to hammer out yet another Constitution for the country. For when so much is darkly gloomy, one of the few rays of hope comes from the daily debates of the 117 delegates who were elected in September.

It is almost fashionable for sophisticated, cynical Vietnamese to decry the new body. They say the members are too young, and that they have not the remotest conception of what a Constitution is and even less hope of ever being able to draft anything that has a chance of working.

The truth is that some wise and brave ideas are being brought forward in the debates and, contrary to many expectations and the hopes of the military Government, the Assembly has already shown that it is no mere puppet of the Government and is likely to produce a document which will reflect the Vietnamese will to be governed by a democratically

elected Government which will be bound by the Constitution to defend and respect the rights of the individual.

Article 20 of the law setting up the Constituent Assembly gives the present Government the right to amend any part of the Constitution presented by the Assembly, and these amendments will stand unless they are rejected by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly's members.

The Government naturally believed that, with 20 Army officers in the Assembly, there would be no difficulty in getting the support of a further 10 members which would be enough to ensure that the Government's will would prevail. But already, by a much larger majority than two thirds, the Assembly has passed a resolution asking the Government to amend Article 20.

Further, it has asked the Government to delete the article which would automatically end the Assembly's life once the Constitution is passed. It wants to stay in existence until the elections.

The Assembly, convened on September 27, got off to a slow start as it had first to scrutinise the elections of its own members (it found no irregularities), work out its rules of procedure, and elect its committees.

However, on November 26 the debate on the principles of the Constitution started, and the Assembly has now passed a list of 10 basic rights and 12 basic duties of the citizen. It is a fairly conventional statement of individual freedom, but it lays down one interesting rule—no military personnel on active duty can participate in party politics or hold Government office.

This clear anti-militarist provision is unlikely to be accepted by the Government, but it would certainly reflect the opinion of the majority of Vietnamese. What the Assembly has to work out is the proper relationship between the future Government and the Army. The Army has the cream of Vietnamese men—it supplies the administrators of the 43 provinces and their districts. They have discipline, education, and experience, and they will be needed to rebuild the country. The Assembly has also to recognise that any Government will need to have emergency powers, but it has to devise the proper checks on their use.

Now the debate centres on the system of government. The drafting committee was equally divided on whether there should be a presidential system as in the United States or a President and Prime Minister as in France. Some members fear the latter system would present too ready-made slots for General Thieu and Air Vice-Marshal Ky. It has been suggested there should be two legislative Houses, both elected directly, an independent Judiciary headed by a Supreme Court, and an independent Inspectorate with the duty of safeguarding the rights of the individual and watching over the honesty of the Administration.

The Army will certainly put up its own candidate for Presi-

dent, whether he be in or out of uniform, a dangerous enough step which could relight the latent rivalries between the generals, but in view of the wide divergence of interests of prospective politicians it may be hard to find opposing candidates who could attract Buddhists and Catholics, Northerners and Southerners.

Meanwhile, the political situation remains as stable or as unstable as it has during the past 17 months. Ky has shown a surprising dexterity in keeping himself afloat. He survived the struggle with the Buddhists last spring and emerged with an enhanced authority.

Ky has also managed to quieten the rivalry between the North and South which threatened his Government before the Manila conference. Four of the seven civilian Ministers who threatened to resign did indeed leave the Government, but in the end their departure was quiet.

Ky's removal of General Quang, commander of the Fourth Corps area, which comprises the Mekong delta, from active command to Minister of Industrial Development also passed off without a ripple of trouble.

But the Government's greatest source of strength stems from the success of September's elections.

On the economic front the Government, pushed by American advisers, have had some success in stabilising prices. Since the devaluation of the Vietnamese piastre by 50 per cent, the cost-of-living index has levelled out. This itself was a courageous act, taken at the height of the riots in Da Nang, and, together with the decision to grant open import licences, it has meant that consumer goods have flowed in to mop up the excess money in circulation and put an end to speculation in commodities (the exception is the motor-scooter, which nearly every Vietnamese is determined to possess).

The political crystal ball is cloudy, but 1967 will tell whether the Government is serious in its declared intention to build a democratic South Vietnam.

February 1967

A Time Magazine article in the 23 December 1966 issue had the following to say about persisting rumors regarding the assassination of Constituent Assemblyman Tran Van Van:

"To Saigon's compulsive intriguers, the rumor had a certain superficial plausibility. Scarcely a month before the murder, Ky's Cabinet had very nearly collapsed in a dispute between the northern-born generals around Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and the native southerners, who felt that they were losing out in power and patronage. Tran Van Van had been the most articulate southerner in the Assembly and the strident leader of its antigovernment, antimilitary faction, and in recent weeks had increasingly antagonized the ruling generals. He had led a bitter struggle against the generals' power to veto or amend the new constitution that the Assembly is writing.

"Strong President. In one of his last acts, Van had tried to ram through the Assembly an article setting the minimum age for South Viet Nam's chief executive at 40 rather than the anticipated 35. His target, of course, was Premier Ky, who is only 36, and would thus be prohibited from running for President. So it was only natural for many a southerner to suspect Ky of complicity in Van's death -- the kind of divisiveness that could only please the Viet Cong. Ky hardly helped matters last week by closing down the Viet Nam Guardian and the Saigon Post, two daily newspapers that had defied government censorship to print some of the rumors.

"The Assembly, on the southern bloc's urging, took time out from its rulemaking to condemn "with energy the savage deed of the assassins from whatever origin," and set up its own miniature Warren Commission, chaired by a southerner, to investigate Van's death. The Deputies' real task, however, proceeded apace toward the Assembly's February deadline for presenting the nation with a draft constitution. With Van's southern colleagues dissenting, the Assembly voted for a Korean-style governmental outline for the nation's future. It provides for a strong, popularly elected President who will choose his own Premier. The Premier and his Cabinet will be subject to parliamentary control, and can be ousted by the legislature if need be while the President continues to provide a shield of stability over the fledgling nation's growth."

Facts from newspaper material re Constituent Assembly.

Deadline for the Assembly to complete draft: 27 March 1967.

Deadline for Directorate to proclaim constitution after it submitted: 30 days.

Deadline for elections after promulgation of constitution: 3 to 5 months (Premier Ky has announced it to be 3 months).

(Cont.)

Completion of first draft of constitution: end of January 1967.  
Included in first draft, provisions for:

1. an Executive with a strong president and vice president elected by direct popular vote, prime minister appointed by president;
2. a Parliament composed of a Senate (30-50 members) representing regional interests (provincial) and a House of Representatives (120-200 members) with the powers to demand, by a 2/3's majority vote, that the president dismiss individual ministers or the whole cabinet; Senatorial power to control the appointment of high officials, in particular of ambassadors and generals;
3. a Judiciary with strong powers composed of a Supreme court, a Council of Magistracy, a Special Court and a Board of Censors
4. formalising the right of opposition and of setting up parties, as well as freedom of the press and habeas corpus
5. election of province and district chiefs by people instead of the military - (a centuries old custom).

### Local Elections in South Vietnam

The South Vietnamese government recently issued two decrees providing for the election of village councils and hamlet chiefs, and governing the reorganization of local administration. This means that popular control in the form of elected officials and assemblies could bring back relatively broad autonomy and fiscal responsibility to the rice roots level.

The elections will begin in April and be staggered through early June 1967 so that security forces can be concentrated area by area to enable as broad a vote as possible despite disruptive attempts by the Viet Cong. Each village - depending on size - will elect six to twelve citizens to serve three-year terms on a village council, a deliberative body. These councilmen will then make one of their number village chief. The village chief will also act as chairman of the community's administrative committee, which is the executive body at the hamlet level. The hamlet chief, who is elected by the people of the hamlet, represents his hamlet before the village committee along with three or four other chiefs of the hamlets comprising that village. The hamlet chief also represents village authority in the hamlet.

The South Vietnamese government decrees also provided for a secret ballot and universal suffrage.

Local government has been largely appointive ever since the Diem regime abolished elected village administrations in 1956 in order to centralize its power. There are dangers in reinstituting self-rule in rural areas: the peasantry may lack sufficient experience to govern itself; elected officials are at the top of Viet Cong assassination lists; the village councils could be infiltrated by those who do not believe in self government; there are also advantages that could accrue: an increased popular base in even a portion of the nation's 500 villages and 11,000 hamlets would establish a foundation for political evolution; with farmers making up 85% of the nation's population, it would be difficult for the opponents of self government to use the old arguments about the central government being oppressive and insensitive to the aspirations of the people; the example of elections freely held in numerous areas could provide a useful contrast for Viet Cong-controlled areas where the Viet Cong has rigidly dominated the villagers and never provided any segment of the good life; giving the peasant a greater stake in his existence would also help combat the political apathy prevalent in so much of the countryside; if the citizen had a say so instead of being told, he could be helpful in seeing that foreign aid funds and materials were used more constructively; villagers responsible to their own people could be more interested in weeding out corruption; there is increased likelihood of increased cooperation with the central government, especially in areas such as military intelligence where the farmer could so often have helped in the past had he cared enough to do so.

Science Surveys  
Chicago, Illinois

February 1967

INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC IN THE USSR MINIMIZED

All reports reviewed to date concerning the current influenza epidemic in the USSR seem designed to reassure the populace that the situation is under control and that there is no cause for alarm. As expected, no morbidity or mortality figures have appeared in either the central or provincial press. Most articles are didactic in tone, discussing the disease in general, reiterating past epidemics, and advocating various protective measures; no present danger is mentioned specifically.

Noteworthy among these reports is an article by A.A. Smorodintsev, Leningrad virologist, published in Pravda, 16 January, in response to readers' queries about the increase of flu cases in Moscow. Smorodintsev discusses modern research methods in the control of influenza and mentions a decision to establish an All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Influenza, which will be the first institution of its kind. He also notes with regret that the "material needs of biological and medical science" required to develop and manufacture antiviral vaccines and medicines are far from satisfied, and lists a number of sophisticated devices needed by researchers in addition to "elementary equipment and reagents."

V.M. Zhdanov, another prominent Soviet virologist, purports to discuss "the new epidemic" in Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 24 January, but devotes his article to virus mutability and different types of immunity, admitting only that influenza can be a dangerous disease.

A representative sampling of other articles indicates that the first outbreaks occurred in Central Asia at the end of December 1966 and that the disease spread to Moscow subsequently. Sovetskaya Estoniya, 22 January, published in Tallin, notes that the epidemic is proceeding without complications and that outbreaks are being reported in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and "other European countries." This article also cautions that although the danger of an increase in the incidence of the ongoing epidemic should not be exaggerated, it cannot be ignored. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 25 January (Alma-Ata) and Sovetskaya Latvija, 27 January (Riga) attribute the epidemic primarily to type B virus but state that type A has also been encountered. Type A2 has been implicated in Latvia. O.V. Baroyan, director of the Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology imeni Gamaleya, states in Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 14 January, that type B influenza virus does not cause "severe" disease and that no threat of a pandemic exists. Kommunist, 1 February, attributes most cases in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia to A2 virus. An article in Vechernyaya Moskva, 27 January, addresses itself to the proposition that flu is easier to prevent than to cure, and recommends cleanliness, intranasal powders (sulfonamide, streptocide) to be taken following contact with patients, avoidance of crowds, aspirin at the first sign of malaise, and other measures to attenuate the course of the disease.

(Cont.)

Most authors agree that constant mutation of influenza viruses and the impermanence of immunity constitute impediments to the development of a "radical" agent for controlling the disease.

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"The safeguarding of the health of the populace is one of the major tasks of the Soviet state, which cares for the high level of the physical well-being of the populace, for the prolongation of life and the flourishing of its citizens. The care of the state for the safeguarding of the people's health has been ordained in the basic law of the Soviet state: the Stalinist Constitution. Not in a single one of the constitutions of the bourgeois states is there even mention of the obligation of the state to safeguard the health of the citizens." Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Second Edition, vol. 16, page 597.

In their publications and pronouncements the Soviets try to convey their thesis that the over-all care of the health of citizens of the USSR is superior to that of any other country. Soviet spokesmen do not hesitate to ascribe such superiority to the system of the USSR. Whereas in making these assertions to foreigners they rarely offer qualifications, the Soviets are obliged by circumstances to speak very carefully when addressing their own populace. For Soviet citizens are far too aware of the shortcomings of health care in the USSR to accept extravagant claims of Soviet superiority in this sphere. Soviet citizens would be skeptical of such claims due to the extraordinary frequency of influenza epidemics in the USSR and because of their own everyday experiences with medical practices and hospitals, as well as by their observations of Soviet backwardness in medical technology and the absence of significant accomplishments in medical research.

Influenza epidemics in the USSR: Reports by foreign doctors, diplomats, official visitors, and tourists visiting the USSR provide abundant evidence that there have been at least 6 influenza epidemics in the past 11 years. The Soviet press, by issuing warnings to stay indoors and discussing research on influenza and occasionally providing indications of the existence of epidemics, have indirectly confirmed the reports by foreigners. However, the Soviet government and its press has been very reticent in reporting essential facts about the epidemics.

The epidemic of February-March 1965 illustrates the inadequacy of Soviet reporting on medical problems. After the epidemic had struck a city, local newspapers and radio broadcasts warned people to stay away from crowds and take other precautions. But neither the local nor the national press provided significant information that would indicate the number of cases, the geographical incidence, or the severity of the sickness. In contrast with this almost blank picture of the situation is the revelation on page 80 of the December 1966 issue of the Statistical Herald (Vestnik Statistiki) that there were 109,000 more deaths in 1965 than in 1964 and that, according to a footnote to the 1965 figure, the increase in the population's mortality "was caused by the grippe [synonymous with influenza] epidemic in February-March 1965."



The Soviet press handling of the 1967 epidemic is somewhat fuller, yet still does not provide Soviet citizens and non-Soviet epidemiologists with useful information. The attached survey of the Soviet press on this subject confirms only that there has been an epidemic in 1967, and that it is widespread. (Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic republics, and Central Asia have already been afflicted; in addition, the epidemic may have spread to the Georgian and Azerbaydzhan Republics in the Trans-Caucasus region).

An absence of information on the use or effectiveness of nasal spray immunization against influenza seems to confirm that this technique has proved to be a failure. It will be recalled that the Soviets gave publicity to this technique in the early 1960's, but later on they curtailed reporting as the large-scale trials showed that the technique was ineffective. In this context it is significant that the government has not provided adequate equipment and supplies for the development and manufacture of antiviral vaccines and medicines. For, according to the prominent virologist A. Smorodintsev:

"Developing and manufacturing anti-influenza vaccines and drugs requires a great deal of complicated apparatus and reagents. Unfortunately, the material demands of medical and biological science are far from fully met. This is true of the complicated apparatus of the ultracentrifuge type, ultrarefrigerators, instruments for vacuum drying of live vaccines, precise thermostats, varied instruments for automatic recording of the results of biochemical and immunological research. There is an even more acute shortage of elementary equipment, materials and reagents. And after all, only the alchemists were able to 'create science' out of thin air....

There is no doubt that a good supply of materials to scientific establishments would make it possible for Soviet science to quickly and successfully solve the many problems of the treatment and prevention of various diseases." [Pravda (Truth) Jan 16, 1967]

Although Smorodintsev mentioned in that same article that the Soviets are planning to build an influenza institute in Leningrad (reported elsewhere to be a center for research by 500 scientists on all respiratory diseases) there is no indication that the Soviets are currently making progress towards filling this wide gap in their health program.

General status of Soviet health care: Other deficiencies in medical services have been reported from a variety of sources. Foreigners tend to contrast their findings in the USSR with the generally more favorable situation in their own countries. The Soviets' own medical journals and newspapers reflect criticism of many aspects of health care, revealing discrepancies between the planned or desired situation and the real situation in the USSR. The Soviet citizen is rarely heard from; but when he voices his opinions, he tends to be critical of the medical care he receives.

The most forthright foreign criticism of Soviet health care was levelled in Time of 30 Sept. 1966 by Dr. Robert M. Hall, a Pittsburgh surgeon who was invited to the USSR to visit what he believed to be some of the best Soviet hospitals, in which he observed 15 operations. Dr. Hall is quoted as follows:

"There is no area of equipment or instrumentation that comes close to that in the United States. I saw no hospital or institute as well equipped as any hospital or institute in the U.S. ... I was appalled by the primitive conditions... Diagnostic work is primitive... X-ray equipment is antiquated. Blood-chemistry analysis is inefficient. [Electronic devices are] virtually unavailable. Medical technology, as we know it, is non-existent."

Furthermore, Dr. Hall stated that the lack of cleanliness was appalling, that surgical instruments were crude, that the daily number of operations at Soviet hospitals was as little as one-third of that of comparable U.S. hospitals, and that there was no evidence of a transfer of the medical competence developed in support of the Soviet space program to uses for the people.

Other foreigners have couched their criticism in milder terms, but they frequently criticize Soviet health care for:

- inefficiency in the use of hospital facilities (hospital stays are prolonged and sometimes not necessary);
- inferior quality of hospital structures and equipment, and poor maintenance and sanitation;
- over-specialization of medical institutions (for babies, maternity care, adults) instead of general hospitals where services and equipment can be concentrated;
- ineffective administration of hospitals (haphazard records, use of doctors for routine clerical duties, slow service, poor scheduling);
- inadequate and technologically backward equipment and instruments for diagnosis and treatment;
- limitations on doctors' ability to do research and produce innovations in the practice of medicine.

Criticism in the Soviet medical press is constant yet selective. Rarely does an article condemn more than a limited aspect of medical care in the USSR. Yet, as surveys of Soviet science reveal, the totality of these press criticisms leads to the conclusion that general Soviet health care is, at best, of mediocre quality. Some of these criticisms point to:

Quality of doctors: Few doctors have received adequate training in the use of instruments and modern technology, as was revealed in Meditsinskaya Gazeta (Medical Gazette) of Dec. 17, 1965. Furthermore, there has been a scarcity of specialists such as surgeons in the USSR in spite of the large number of licensed medical doctors. Indifference affects "some doctors," who reportedly "act rather carelessly towards influenza." (Moskovskaya Pravda [Moscow Pravda] June 29, 1966). An absence of outstanding medical ability is attested by the failure of any Soviet doctor or medical researcher to win a Nobel Prize since the early 1920's.

Equipment and instruments: Current reports indicate that substantial improvements have not been made in the quality of Soviet medical equipment and instruments since the publication in Meditsinskaya Gazeta, July 21, 1964, of a detailed study which revealed general deficiencies in quality, reliability, and durability. In 1963 alone, health institutions submitted 1,200 complaints to producers of medical equipment. Flaws in technological design were noted; in Moscow, "50 percent of the new electrocardiographs were shown to be unsuitable for their specified purpose." The medical instrument industry was scored for failing to apply advances in electronics. Laboratory and pharmacy equipment such as hypodermic needles, centrifuges, distillation apparatus are severely criticized, as are a wide range of surgical tools including cutting instruments and clamps. Major blame for this state of affairs has been attributed to the failure of Soviet research institutes and manufacturers to work together for improvement.

Use of available equipment: Poor organization has resulted in a generally low rate of use of equipment for diagnostic and research work. Indifference sometimes allows costly equipment to be misused; for example, a vehicle with X-ray equipment was used for ordinary hauling in Kirov Oblast, according to Meditsinskaya Gazeta of September 9, 1966.

Administration: Repeated changes in over-all organization reflect dissatisfaction with the administration and management of health programs. The research program is a case in point, having been decentralized in 1957 and recentralized in 1965: both times for the sake of increasing efficiency. A major complaint was that research findings were not being translated into practice. As an illustration, Soviet researchers determined that Type B influenza virus recurs every 3-4 years; yet this forecast did not result in measures prior to the recent epidemic to alleviate its effects.

Availability of pharmaceuticals: In the early 1960's there were repeated indications in the press of a nation-wide shortage of drugs and health care products such as bandages and disinfectants. More recently, the supply of basic drugs appears to be adequate, although many of the more advanced pharmaceuticals have not been reported to be in use. The Soviets have virtually confirmed their shortage by suppressing all data on quantities or values of drugs produced, both totals for

the economy and of particular kinds of drugs. The present Soviet goal, according to Izvestiya (News) Mar. 12, 1966, is to increase pharmaceutical production between 1965 and 1970 by 70 percent, including more than a trebling of vitamin production (or an increase of 220 percent). But, pending publication of basic statistics, it still must be concluded that a shortage of many pharmaceuticals will continue.

Popular criticism of the USSR medical program is rarely publicized, yet there is some reason to believe that Soviet citizens are not completely satisfied with the health care they receive. Such dissatisfaction was expressed in Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette) of Dec. 8, 1966 by 2 citizens making a plea for fee-charging nursing homes. They said:

"We need not fear the word 'fees.' There are polyclinics that charge fees; out of embarrassment we call them economic-accountability clinics. These polyclinics are extremely popular, partly because here a person can choose his doctor according to his own taste and judgment. Experience shows that the modest fees frighten off no one. Incidentally, the term 'economic accountability' is employed only in official documents. The patients never call it anything but a 'paid polyclinic.'

Why not take the next step and, along with fee-charging polyclinics, set up paid nursing homes? We do not propose to replace free medical aid, but to establish parallel with this another type of medical institution. These would differ not only in the fact that they charge for their services but also in their particular function."